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Исследовательский семинар 24 марта

Очередной семинар по экономике состоится 24 марта в 16.50.
Адрес: Кантемировская ул., дом 3,Высшая Школа Экономики, ауд. 358 
Тема доклада: Seller-paid ratings
Докладчик: Сергей Ковбасюк (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance, Рим)

Аннотация: We study the interaction between the seller of a product, the buyers who are uncertain about the product quality and a rating agency who observes the quality and sends signals about it. Assuming the seller-pays model of rating agency, we analyze the cases in which the payment to the rater is publicly disclosed and fixed, publicly disclosed and rating-contingent, private and rating-contingent. First, we characterize all possible equilibrium partitions of the underlying quality range into ratings in these three cases. Under a fixed payment, the ratings are cheap talk and convey no information in equilibrium. When the payment is public and rating-contingent, perfectly revealing ratings are feasible. Under a private rating-contingent payment, only partitions with coarse ratings are feasible. We then characterize the seller's optimal ratings in the three cases. Under a public rating-contingent payment the seller prefers perfectly revealing ratings with positive payments above some quality threshold, and a single coarse rating with zero payments below the threshold (rejections). Under a fixed payment and under a private rating-contingent payment the seller prefers uninformative rating. Finally, we perform welfare analysis and discuss regulation. A desirable regulati on of payments requires public disclosure and allows contingent payments.

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