Учебный семинар по Social Choice и Mechanism Design 2 октября в 18:20
We consider equitable allocations under both fixed and variable amounts ofgoods/resources available. First, we provide a selective survey of basic definitions and results related tothe problem of fair division under fixed bundles of goods. Particular attention will be paid toeconomies with many agents. We then move on to the case when the amounts of goods/resources arevariable. In this regard, we focus on the paper by Moulin and Thomson (1988), which providesexamples of well-behaved (e.g. homothetic and convex) preferences that render incompatible thefollowing desired properties of fair division: Pareto-optimality, resource-monotonicity, and individualrationality from equal division.
Мето проведения: Кантемировская 3, каб.346
Время проведения: 18:20
семинар по Social Choice 02.10.15.pdf