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HSE SPb & EUSP Research Seminar on September, 12: Marcelo Ariel Fernandez (Johns Hopkins University)

Topic: Deferred Acceptance and Regret-Free Truthtelling: A Characterization Result
Date & Time: September, 12; 18:00 - 19:30
Venue: St Petersburg, Fontanka river embankment, 27, PDMI RAS, Marble hall (2nd floor)

We invite you to participate in the HSE in St Petersburg and European University in St Petersburg Research seminar on September, 12
Marcelo Ariel Fernandez (Johns Hopkins University) will give a talk on Deferred Acceptance and Regret-Free Truthtelling: A Characterization Result (please find the abstract below)
Marcelo's research interests: Microeconomic Theory, Market Design, Matching, Mechanism Design, Political Economy

Time: 18:00 - 19:30
Venue: St Petersburg, Fontanka river embankment, 27, PDMI RAS, Marble hall (2nd floor)


Abstract:

In this paper, I analyze centralized matching markets and rationalize why the arguably most heavily used mechanism in applications, the deferred acceptance mechanism, has been so successful in practice, despite the fact that it provides participants with opportunities to “game the system.” Accounting for the lack of information that participants typically have in these markets in practice, I introduce a new notion of behavior under uncertainty that captures participants’ aversion to experience regret. I show that participants optimally choose not to manipulate the deferred acceptance mechanism in order to avoid regret. Moreover, the deferred acceptance mechanism is the unique mechanism within an interesting class (quantile stable) to induce honesty from participants in this way. 


Calendar: https://tinyurl.com/spbecon
Research seminar webpage: http://scem.spb.hse.ru/en/ilgt/hse-eusp-seminar