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News

HSE SPb & EUSP Research Seminar on September, 5: Constantine Sorokin (Glasgow University and HSE - St Petersburg)

Topic: A New Approach to Contests with Complete and Incomplete Information
Date & Time: September, 5; 18:00 - 19:30
Venue: St Petersburg, Fontanka river embankment, 27, PDMI RAS, Marble hall (2nd floor)

We invite you to participate in the HSE in St Petersburg and European University in St Petersburg Research seminar on September, 5
Constantine Sorokin (Glasgow University and HSE in St Petersburg will give a talk on A New Approach to Contests with Complete and Incomplete Information (joint with Alexander Matros). Please find the abstract below.
Constantine's research interests: Bayesian Persuasion, Mechanism Design, Stochastic Voting, Local Public Goods and Foot-Voting, Decentralised Arbitration

Time: 18:00 - 19:30
Venue: St Petersburg, Fontanka river embankment, 27, PDMI RAS, Marble hall (2nd floor)

Before the seminar, from 12:00 till 16:30, Constantine will be available for individual meetings at 3A Kantemirovskaya st., room 404.
If you want to have a meeting, please contact Artem Baklanov via artem.baklanov@gmail.com

Abstract:

Conflict literature usually assumes that the individual contest success function is monotonic in her own effort. This assumption means  that participants cannot burn out in their efforts.  We suggest and analyze a new contest success function, which allows  for a positive success probability even with zero individual effort  and resolves the burn out problem.  In addition, it also allows to study the case when an increase in  maximal player effort bestows a positive externality on other  contenders, increasing their marginal probability of winning. This situation usually arises in R&D competition and patent races and  cannot be modeled by standard Tullock-style contests.  Our approach permits to find a closed form solution and obtain valuable comparative static results not only for the complete information case, (both for mixed and pure strategies), but also for the case of incomplete (private) information. Particularly, we are able to address an important question of information design in contests. 


Calendar: https://tinyurl.com/spbecon
Research seminar webpage: http://scem.spb.hse.ru/en/ilgt/hse-eusp-seminar