In this paper we estimate the effects of indicators of “hard” and “soft” infrastructure on export performance in Russian regions. Empirical results show that both hard and soft infrastructure measures matter for export survival of export flows from non-resource-oriented Russian regions. Empirical estimates account for size and time effects for export flows and find that the positive effects of hard and soft infrastructure are falling over time and are more important for larger exporters. This may serve as an evidence of a learning curve for exporters when the latter become more efficient with time in treating with regional-level hard and soft infrastructure resources
This paper provides a pioneering approach to estimate the relationship between interregional human capital mobility and the occurrence of high-growth firms (HGFs). We construct and employ the dataset on mobility of university graduates from top-100 Russian universities. We find that the relationship between the mobility of high-skilled university graduates and high-growth firms is non-linear and U-shaped: the initial rise in the number of HGFs is due to the relatively low concentration of highly skilled migrants and availability of innovations only for a small number of firms. However, the competition effect strengthens at some point when innovations become available for larger number of firms simultaneously with large inflow of highly skilled university graduates.
We develop a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous agents who self-select into occupations (entrepreneurs and workers) depending on innate ability. The effect of market size on the equilibrium occupational structure crucially hinges on properties of the lower tier utility function—its scale elasticity and relative love for-variety.When combined with the underlying ability distribution, the share of entrepreneurs and income inequality can increase or decrease with market size. When extended to allow for the endogenous sorting of mobile agents between cities, numerical examples suggest that sorting may increase inequality within and between cities.
We provide a selective survey of what has been accomplished under the heading of monopolistic competition in industrial organization and other economic fields. Among other things, we argue that monopolistic competition is a market structure in its own right, which encompasses a much broader set-up than the celebrated constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model. Although oligopolistic and monopolistic competition compete for adherents within the economics profession, we show that this dichotomy is, to a large extend, unwarranted.
We develop a product-differentiated model where the product space is a network defined as a set of varieties (nodes) linked by their degrees of substitutability (edges). We also locate consumers into this network, so that the location of each consumer (node) corresponds to her "ideal" variety. We show that there exists a unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium where prices are determined by both the firms' sign-alternating Bonacich centralities and the average willingness to pay across consumers. We also investigate how local product differentiation and the spatial discount factor affect the equilibrium prices. We show that these effects non-trivially depend on the network structure. In particular, we find that, in a star-shaped network, the central firm does not always enjoy higher monopoly power than the peripheral firms.
Standard measures of competitive toughness fail to capture the fact that, as consumers optimize intertemporally, firms operating today compete with (yet non-existent) businesses which will be started tomorrow. We develop a two-tier CES model of dynamic monopolistic competition in which the impact of product differentiation on the market outcome depends crucially on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). The degree of product differentiation per se fails to serve as a meaningful indicator of competitive toughness: what matters is its cross-effect with EIS. We also extend the model to the case of non-CES preferences to capture variable markups.
This paper documents the negative relationship between the age of cities and their average wages in Russia and a number of post-Soviet countries. To determine age-related urban characteristics responsible for this relationship, we develop a spatial equilibrium model as a framework to guide the interpretation of the regression estimates. Higher real wages in newer cities reflect both their disadvantages as places for living and their production advantages. The latter are related to their production amenities, higher shares of skilled workers, and more available natural resources. These advantages and disadvantages tend to disappear over time, which gives rise to income convergence.
This book is addressed to lecturers and researchers specializing in the field of institutional economics, economic history and related disciplines.
This article studies the gender composition of corporate boards of Russian companies, including its relation to company performance. The analysis is based on a unique longitudinal dataset of virtually all Russian companies whose shares were traded on the stock market in 1998—2014. It shows a relatively small representation of women, just 12% of all the seats, while about 40% of the companies did not have any female director. At the same time, both the share of companies that appoint female directors and the share of female directors on boards show a clear upward trend. The econometric analysis suggests a positive link between the presence of female directors on boards and company performance, especially when firms appoint several, rather than one, female directors.
We use the payment schedule based approach to ensure stable cooperation in multistage games with vector payoffs.
This article provides new evidence on the structure, dynamics and performance effects of corporate boards in publicly traded companies in Russia. It takes advantage of a new and unique longitudinal dataset of virtually all Russian companies whose shares were traded in the RTS/MICEX/MOEX over 1998-2014. The analysis highlights a number of strong trends in the evolution of boards of directors, such as a declining participation of insider directors and an increasing participation of foreign and female directors. It also shows that board characteristics are linked to company performance (market-to-book ratio, Tobin's Q, ROE and ROA), suggesting that boards of directors play a non-trivial role in corporate governance in Russia. Testing for structural breaks in the relationship between board composition and firm performance provides some evidence of the changing role of corporate boards over time.
This paper examines some institutional factors of regional export and perspective of extension this view on export problems. Much research on the export has been done worldwide over the recent years. However, traditional approach prevails in them. Therefore, this study aims at revealing, whether business-state relations might be considered as an effective factor for evaluating export dynamics. Finally, using the software package for econometrics modeling, the regression model can be evaluated. Approach’s acknowledgment may positively effect the export dynamics investigation.
We study monopolistic competition with symmetric directly additive preferences (generating variable mark-ups) and an endogenous technology choice. Each firm chooses an investment in R&D to decrease its marginal cost. We prove that the equilibrium R&D investment increases with market size (a larger population or trade) only if the price-elasticity of demand is an increasing function. Together with the output levels, such equilibrium investments may be socially excessive or insufficient, depending on whether the elasticity of the subutility is increasing or decreasing. The main implication is that opening up to free trade can foster R&D through variable mark-ups.
A mixed manna contains goods (that everyone likes), bads (that everyone dislikes), as well as items that are goods to some agents, but bads or satiated to others.
If all items are goods and utility functions are homothetic, concave (and monotone), the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes maximizes the Nash product of utilities: hence it is welfarist (determined utility-wise by the feasible set of profiles), single-valued and easy to compute.
We generalize the Gale-Eisenberg Theorem to a mixed manna. The Competitive division is still welfarist and related to the product of utilities or disutilities. If the zero utility profile (before any manna) is Pareto dominated, the competitive profile is unique and still maximizes the product of utilities. If the zero profile is unfeasible, the competitive profiles are the critical points of the product of disutilities on the efficiency frontier, and multiplicity is pervasive. In particular, the task of dividing a mixed manna is either good news for everyone, or bad news for everyone.
We refine our results in the practically important case of linear preferences, where the axiomatic comparison between the division of goods and that of bads is especially sharp. When we divide goods and the manna improves, everyone weakly benefits under the competitive rule; but no reasonable rule to divide bads can be similarly Resource Monotonic. Also, the much larger set of Non Envious and Efficient divisions of bads can be disconnected so that it will admit no continuous selection.