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World War I led to radical changes in the government policy of participating countries. The enormous demographic and economic disturbances caused by the war forced the governments of all the belligerent nations to drastically restrict the market freedom. In particular, the state began actively intervening in the housing market. Ukraine as a part of the former Russian Empire, for the first time in its history saw the introduction of rent controls and protection of tenants from eviction. This paper concentrates on the government intervention in the rental housing market of Right-Bank Ukraine during World War I (1914-1918). It identifies the factors that made the state intervene in the relationships between landlords and tenants; analyzes changes in the housing legislation; and assesses the effectiveness of the regulations.
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine that started in March 2014 led Western countries and Russia to impose economic sanctions on each other, including the euro zone members. The paper investigates the impact of the sanctions on the real side of the economies of Russia and the euro area. The effects of sanctions are analyzed with a structural vector autoregression. To pin down the effect we are interested in, we include an index that measures the intensity of the sanctions in the model. The sanction shock is identified and separated from the oil price shock by narrative sign restrictions. We find weak evidence that Russian and euro area GDPs declined as a result of the sanctions. The effects of the sanctions are also small for the real effective exchange rate.
We compare the Egalitarian rule (aka Egalitarian Equivalent) and the Competitive rule (aka Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) to divide bads (chores). They are both welfarist: the competitive disutility profile(s) are the critical points of their Nash product on the set of efficient feasible profiles. The C rule is Envy Free, Maskin Monotonic, and has better incentives properties than the E rule. But, unlike the E rule, it can be wildly multivalued, admits no selection continuous in the utility and endowment parameters, and is harder to compute. Thus in the division of bads, unlike that of goods, no rule normatively dominates the other.