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Статья
Towards a SaaS Pricing Cookbook: A Multi-vocal Literature Review

Saltan A.

Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing. 2019. No. 370. P. 114-129.

Глава в книге
Toxic Communication on Twitch.tv. Effect of a Streamer
В печати

Poyane R.

In bk.: Digital Transformation and Global Society. Fourth International Conference, DTGS 2019, St. Petersburg, Russia, June 19–21, 2019, Revised Selected Papers. 2019. Ch. 34.

Препринт
Minimal Envy and Popular Matchings

Kondratev A., Nesterov A. S.

arxiv.org. Computer Science. Cornell University, 2019

XXIV заседание регулярного научного семинара департамента экономики

На XXIV заседании научного семинара департамента экономики Санкт-Петербургской школы экономики и менеджмента НИУ ВШЭ с докладом «Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanism» выступит доцент департамента экономики, PhD, Александр Сергеевич Нестеров. Семинар состоится 5 октября в 17:30 по адресу: Кантемировская улица, д.3, корп. 1, лит. А, ауд. 358. Ждем всех заинтересовавшихся преподавателей, исследователей, студентов.
Аннотация:

I consider the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are absent and an outside option may exist.  I study the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanisms the following efficiency and fairness criteria are mutually incompatible: (1) ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness, (2) ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness, and (3) ordinal efficiency and equal division lower bound. Result 1 is the first impossibility result for this setting that uses ex-post efficiency; results 2 and 3 are more practical than similar results in the literature. In addition, for N=3,  I provide two characterizations of the celebrated random serial dictatorship mechanism: it is the unique strategy-proof, ex-post efficient mechanism that (4) provides agents that have the same ordinal preferences with assignments not dominated by each other (weak envy-freeness among equals), or (5) provides agents that have the same cardinal preferences with assignments of equal expected utility (symmetry). These results strengthen the characterization by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001); result 5 implies the impossibility result by Zhou (1990).